对PRINCE分组密码的不可能差分攻击

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-2400.2017.01.021

西安电子科技大学学报

对PRINCE分组密码的不可能差分攻击

魏悦川1;潘晓中1;戎宜生2;王绪安1

(1. 武警工程大学电子技术系，陕西西安 710086;
2. 武警工程大学装备工程学院，陕西西安 710086)

收稿日期:2015-11-19 出版日期:2017-02-20 发布日期:2017-04-01
作者简介:魏悦川(1982-)，女，讲师，E-mail：wych004@163.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(61202492)；信息保障技术重点实验室开放课题资助项目(KJ-15-010)；陕西省自然科学基础研究计划资助项目(2016JQ6030)

Impossible differential cryptanalysis on the PRINCE

WEI Yuechuan1;PAN Xiaozhong1;RONG Yisheng2;WANG Xu'an1

(1. Dept. of Electronics Technology, Engineering Univ. of Armed Police Force, Xi'an 710086, China;
2. College of Equipment Engineering, Engineering Univ. of Armed Police Force, Xi'an 710086, China)

Received:2015-11-19 Online:2017-02-20 Published:2017-04-01

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

PRINCE是一个具有64bit分组长度，128bit密钥的轻量级分组密码，具有低功耗、低延时等特点．不包含密钥白化的PRINCE密码被称为PRINCEcore．为评估其安全性，笔者对PRINCE密码的线性变换进行统计测试，给出了线性变换的统计特征，并利用“中间相错”的方法构造了PRINCE密码的5轮不可能差分区分器．利用该区分器，结合线性变换的性质，对9轮PRINCEcore进行不可能差分攻击，攻击的数据复杂度为2^61.2，计算复杂度为2^54.3，存储复杂度为2^17.7．测试结果表明，9轮PRINCEcore密码对于文中给出的攻击是不免疫的．

关键词: 分组密码, 不可能差分攻击, PRINCE密码, 攻击复杂度

Abstract:

The PRINCE is a light-weight block cipher with the 64-bit block size and 128-bit key size. It is characterized by low power-consumption and low latency. PRINCEcore is the PRINCE cipher without key-whiting. For evaluating its security, a statistical testing on linear transformation is performed, and a statistical character matrix is given. By using the “miss-in-the-middle” technique, we construct a 5-round impossible differential characteristic. Based on the 5-round distinguisher, a 9-round attack on the PRINCEcore is performed. For the 9-round attack, the data complexity, time complexity and space complexity are 2^61.2, 2^54.3 and 2^17.7, respectively. The testing result shows that the PRINCEcore reduced to 9 rounds is not immune to impossible differential attack.

魏悦川;潘晓中;戎宜生;王绪安. 对PRINCE分组密码的不可能差分攻击[J]. 西安电子科技大学学报, 2017, 44(1): 119-124.

WEI Yuechuan;PAN Xiaozhong;RONG Yisheng;WANG Xu'an. Impossible differential cryptanalysis on the PRINCE[J]. Journal of Xidian University, 2017, 44(1): 119-124.

参考文献

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对PRINCE分组密码的不可能差分攻击

Impossible differential cryptanalysis on the PRINCE

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