RSA时间信道滑动窗口攻击方法及量化分析

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-2400.2017.05.020

西安电子科技大学学报

RSA时间信道滑动窗口攻击方法及量化分析

毛保磊1;慕德俊1;胡伟1,2;张慧翔1;邰瑜1;张璐1,2

(1. 西北工业大学自动化学院，陕西西安 710072；
2. 加州大学圣迭戈分校，美国圣迭戈 92093)

收稿日期:2017-01-05 出版日期:2017-10-20 发布日期:2017-11-29
作者简介:毛保磊(1987-), 男，西北工业大学博士研究生，E-mail：maobaolei524@gmail.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(61303224, 61672433)；博士后科学基金资助项目(2013M532081)；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(3102016JKBJJGZ07)；国家密码发展基金资助项目(MMJJ20170210)

Quantitative analysis of sliding window attack for the RSA timing channel

MAO Baolei1;MU Dejun1;HU Wei1,2;ZHANG Huixiang1;TAI Yu1;ZHANG Lu1,2

(1. School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical Univ., Xi'an 710072, China;
2. University of California, San Diego, San Diego 92093, USA)

Received:2017-01-05 Online:2017-10-20 Published:2017-11-29

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

RSA硬件密码核的时间侧信道对硬件安全构成严重威胁．针对此问题，提出一种显著提高RSA硬件密码核时序攻击成功率的滑动窗口攻击方法;同时提出一种信息理论模型，量化分析该攻击方法提高攻击成功率的机制．通过对RSA密码核进行攻击测试，与Kocher攻击方法相比，滑动窗口时序攻击方法将攻击成功率从73％提高到96％．利用互信息指标测量滑动窗口下密钥对密码核运行时间的影响，实验结果显示，互信息测量结果与攻击成功率存在强相关性．实验结果表明，信息理论模型和指标能够提供一种高效精确的方法以量化分析滑动窗口攻击方法的有效性，评估RSA硬件密码核时间侧信道的安全威胁．

关键词: 侧信道攻击, 信息理论, 量化分析, 信息泄露, 时序攻击

Abstract:

The timing channel residing in RSA hardware implementations imposes a major threat to hardware security. In this work, we propose a sliding window timing attack method with significant improvement in the attack success rate and employ an information theoretic model to quantitatively measure the effectiveness of the proposed attack. Experimental results show that the sliding window attack method increases the attack success rate from 73％ to 96％ as compared to Kocher's timing attack, which uses a single bit window. Our results also reveal a strong correlation between attack success rates and the mutual information measurements of the key and encryption time. This indicates that information theoretic metrics can serve as an approach for quantifying the effectiveness of the sliding window timing attack method and evaluating timing channel threat of the RSA hardware architecture.

Key words: side channel attack, information theory, quantitative analysis, information leakage, timing attack

毛保磊;慕德俊;胡伟;张慧翔;邰瑜;张璐. RSA时间信道滑动窗口攻击方法及量化分析[J]. 西安电子科技大学学报, 2017, 44(5): 114-120.

MAO Baolei;MU Dejun;HU Wei;ZHANG Huixiang;TAI Yu;ZHANG Lu. Quantitative analysis of sliding window attack for the RSA timing channel[J]. Journal of Xidian University, 2017, 44(5): 114-120.

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RSA时间信道滑动窗口攻击方法及量化分析

Quantitative analysis of sliding window attack for the RSA timing channel

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