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  1. (1. 西安电子科技大学 计算机网络与信息安全教育部重点实验室, 陕西 西安 710071;
    2. 解放军信息工程大学 电子技术学院, 河南 郑州 450004)

  • 收稿日期:1900-01-01 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2004-04-20 发布日期:2004-04-20

An intrusion-tolerant conference key distribution scheme

GUO Yuan-bo1,2;MA Jian-feng1


  1. (1. Ministry of Education Key Lab. of Computer Network and Information Security, Xidian Univ., Xi'an 710071, China;
    2. The School of Electronic Technology, Information Engineering Univ. of PLA, Zhengzhou 450004, China)
  • Received:1900-01-01 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2004-04-20 Published:2004-04-20

摘要: 基于可验证秘密共享技术和知识证明,提出了一种计算上安全的容忍入侵的会议密钥分配方案.该方案具有结构简单、安全性强等特点.分析表明,即使方案中实施密钥分配的服务器组中有部分服务器为入侵者所成功控制,会议的所有诚实用户仍可得到关于会议的正确的密钥;在Diffie-Hellmen Decisional问题假设下,任何窃听者均无法得到有关会议密钥的任何信息;主动攻击者也无法成功进行任何假冒.由于采用了非交互式的知识证明,所提方案需要的计算开销和通信开销都比较少,效率较高,有着较强的实用性.

关键词: 会议密钥分配, 容错, 计算安全, 可验证秘密共享, 知识证明

Abstract: This paper proposes a computationally secure and fault-tolerant conference key distribution scheme, which only requires the authenticated and encrypted point-to-point channels between each server and each user. By the combined use of knowledge proof and verifiable secret sharing, the scheme has the properties of simple structure and high security. Analysis shows that every honest user of a conference can get a common key after the running of the protocol, even if a minority of the servers malfunction or misbehave. We also show that on the assumption of a Diffie-Hellman decisional problem, a passive adversary gets zero knowledge about the conference key, and the active adversary cannot impersonate someone successfuly. Because the knowledge proof method we adopt is non-interactive, both operation and communication overheads are reduced, thus making the schemes very efficient.

Key words: conference key distribution, fault-tolerant, computationally secure, verifiable secret sharing, knowledge proof


  • TP309