J4 ›› 2009, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (4): 714-720.

• Original Articles • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Universally composable secure Internet key exchange protocol

PENG Qing-quan;PEI Qing-qi;YANG Chao;MA Jian-feng   

  1. (Ministry of Education Key Lab. of Computer Network and Information Security, Xidian Univ., Xi'an  710071, China)
  • Received:2008-11-21 Online:2009-08-20 Published:2009-09-28
  • Contact: PENG Qing-quan E-mail:qingquanpeng@sina.com

Abstract:

The new Internet key exchange protocol (IKEv2) is analyzed, and it is found that the protocol can not achieve active identity protection to the initiator and has the security flaw of authentication failure in its initial exchange. However, it is necessary to protect the identity information to the initiator under the environment of a wireless access network. In this paper, a novel key exchange protocol for the wireless network based on IKEv2 initial exchange is proposed, which realizes active identity protection to the initiator by the responder explicitly proving his true identity, and achieves successful authentication by reconstructing the authentication payload. With the Universally Composable (UC) security model, this new protocol is analyzed in detail, with the analytical results showing that it affords provably UC security. Performance analysis and simulation results show that the proposed protocol has less computation and communication overhead.

Key words: Internet protocol security, key exchange, Internet key exchange protocol, provably secure, universally composable

CLC Number: 

  • TP393