J4 ›› 2010, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (1): 102-106+118.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1001-2400.2010.01.018

• Original Articles • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Differential-nonlinear attack on 33-round SHACAL-2

WEI Yong-zhuang1,2;HU Yu-pu1;CHEN Jie1,3
  

  1. (1. Ministry of Education Key Lab. of Computer Network and Information Security, Xidian Univ., Xi'an  710071, China;
    2. School of Information and Communication, Guilin Univ. of Electronic Tech., Guilin  541004, China;
    3. State Key Lab. of Information Security, Inst. of Software, Chinese Academy of Sci., Beijing  100039, China)
  • Received:2008-10-20 Online:2010-02-20 Published:2010-03-29
  • Contact: WEI Yong-zhuang E-mail:walker_wei@msn.com

Abstract:

Based on a 17-round differential-nonlinear distinguisher of the SHACAL-2 encryption algorithm, a novel attack on 33-round SHACAL-2 is proposed by guessed subkey space division and Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). Moreover, it is shown that differential nonlinear attack on 33-round SHACAL-2 requires a data complexity of about 244 chosen plaintexts, and a computational complexity of about 2496.6 33-round SHACAL-2 encryptions and about 2502 arithmetic operations. The success rate of this attack is about 0.99. Compared with previous results, this new attack effectively improves the numbers of attacked rounds of SHACAL-2 in a single key attack scenario.

Key words: block ciphers, differential-nonlinear attack, SHACAL-2, computational complexity